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Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from
this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly
at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the
two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the
case. We show that the outcome is in fact strongly dependent on the distance of separation of the two games
in the parameter space. Effectively, this distance introduces payoff heterogeneity, and the average game is
returned only if the heterogeneity is small. For higher levels of heterogeneity the distance to the average game
grows, which often involves the promotion of cooperation. The presented results support preceding research that
highlights the favorable role of heterogeneity regardless of its origin, and they also emphasize the importance of
the population structure in amplifying facilitators of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory [1–5] is a powerful theoretical
framework for studying the emergence of cooperation in com-
petitive settings. The concept of a social dilemma is particu-
larly important, where what is best for an individual is at odds
with what is best for the society as a whole. Probably the most
often studied social dilemma is the prisoner’s dilemma game
[6]. During a pairwise interaction, each player can choose ei-
ther to cooperate or to defect. If both players choose to co-
operate they receive the reward R, while mutual defection
leaves both with the punishment P . A defector exploiting
a cooperator receives the highest payoff, the temptation T ,
whereas the exploited cooperator receives the sucker payoffS.
The typical payoff ranking for the prisoner’s dilemma game is
T > R > P > S [5, 7, 8]. Evidently, whichever strategy the
opponent chooses, it is always better to defect. If both players
are rational and adhere to this, they both end up with a payoff
that is lower than the one they would obtained if they had cho-
sen to cooperate. Despite its simplicity, however, the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game continues to inspire research across
the social and natural sciences [9–27]. If the ranking of the
payoffs is changed, other social dilemmas, such as the snow-
drift game for T > R > S > P , are obtained, which has also
received substantial attention in the recent past [28–34].
Although defection is the rational choice, cooperation in
nature abounds. Eusocial insects like ants and bees are fa-
mous for their large-scale cooperative behavior [35], breed-
ing in birds prompts allomaternal behavior where helpers take
care for the offspring of others [36], and chief among all, we
humans have recently been dubbed supercooperators [37] for
our unparalleled other-regarding abilities and our cooperative
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drive. This fact constitutes an important challenge to Dar-
win’s theory of evolution and natural selection, and accord-
ingly, ample research has been devoted to the identification of
mechanisms that may lead to cooperative resolutions of social
dilemmas. Classic examples reviewed in [38] include kin se-
lection [39], direct and indirect reciprocity [40, 41], network
reciprocity [42], as well as group selection [43]. Diffusion and
mobility have also been studied prominently [44–47], as were
various coevolutionary models [8], involving network topol-
ogy, noise, and aspiration [48–56], to name but a few exam-
ples. In particular, it was found that heterogeneities in the
system, sometimes also referred to as diversity [57], indepen-
dent of its origin, can significantly enhance cooperation levels
in social dilemmas [58–66].
A key assumption behind the vast majority of existing re-
search has been, however, that individuals play the same
type of game with their neighbors during each interaction.
Hashimoto [67, 68] was among the first to study so-called
multigames, or mixed games [69] (for earlier conceptually re-
lated work see [70]), where different players in the popula-
tion might adopt different payoff matrices at different times.
Considering how difficult it is to quantify someone’s percep-
tion of an interaction, it is reasonable to assume that payoff
values have numerical fluctuations. Moreover, there is no ev-
idence that the perceived payoff of individuals never changes
during their lifetime [71]. Based on this, it is natural to ana-
lyze games where the payoff matrices are composed of mix-
tures of different games at different times, as representative
of the natural environment where each individual is subject
to diverse stimuli. This kind of analysis of multi and mixed
games could represent a new line of research in evolution-
ary game theory, considering the merging of various different
games as statistical fluctuations. A complementary approach
to the study of mixed games is the study of games on interde-
pendent networks [72–74], where two distinct structured pop-
ulations interact via dependency links using different games.
2A canonical example of a mixed game perspective is how the
owner of a cheap car can have a very different risk perception
on a highway crossing compared to the owner of a new expen-
sive car. Recent research has revealed that this is an important
consideration, which can have far-reaching consequences for
the outcome of evolutionary games [71, 75, 76].
Here we wish to extend the scope of mixed games [69, 76],
by studying a model where during each interaction individu-
als play a game that is drawn uniformly at random from an
ensemble. In particular, we consider a setup with two dif-
ferent payoff matrices (G1 or G2), and we study evolution-
ary outcomes on the square lattice, on scale-free and on ran-
dom networks. As we will show, our results strongly support
preceding research that highlights the importance of hetero-
geneity, as well as the importance of the population structure
in ensuring favorable resolutions of social dilemmas. First,
however, we proceed with a more detailed description of the
studied evolutionary setup.
II. MIXED GAMES IN STRUCTURED POPULATIONS
In the mixed game model, individuals play different games
during each interaction. The available strategies are coopera-
tion (C) and defection (D). The games are represented by the
payoff matrix
(C D
C 1 S
D T 0
)
,
where T ∈ [0, 2] and S ∈ [−1, 1]. The parametrization
G = (T, S) spans four different classes of games, namely the
prisoner’s dilemma game (PD), the snowdrift game (SD), the
stag-hunt game (SH), and the harmony Game (HG), as shown
in Fig. 1.
The mixed game, Gm, is defined by the random mixture of
two games: G1 = (T, S1) and G2 = (T, S2). Each pair of
games, G1 and G2, have an average game, Ga, given simply
by Ga = (G1+G2)/2. Thus, Ta = T and Sa = (S1+S2)/2.
Each average game, Ga, can be formed by any combina-
tion of two games that are symmetrically distributed around
it. Different mixtures that correspond to the same average
single game can be characterized by the distance ∆S, and
each mixed game is from the average single game, namely
∆S = |S1 − Sa| = |S2 − Sa|. We consider ∆S as a measure
of the payoff heterogeneity of the mixed game. In particu-
lar, ∆S defines how far apart G1 is from G2 in the T − S
parameter plane (as they are symmetric with respect to Ga).
Figure 1 illustrates this definition schematically. We have cho-
sen to focus on the combination of the prisoner’s dilemma and
the snowdrift game because they are the most demanding so-
cial dilemmas, and also because these two evolutionary games
have been studied most commonly in the past. We have veri-
fied that our main results remain valid also for other combina-
tions of games on the T − S parameter plane.
We used the Monte Carlo simulation procedure to obtain
the dynamics of cooperation in structured populations [7].
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FIG. 1: Schematic presentation of the T − S parameter space, as
obtained if usingR = 1 and P = 0. The four evolutionary games are
marked in their corresponding quadrants (see main text for details).
Moreover, we depict graphically that for each pair of games (SD=G1
and PD=G2, for example), there will be an average game that lies in
the middle of the two. Here ∆S denotes how different G1 is from
G2 regarding the parameter S.
The initial configuration is homogeneous: half of the popu-
lation is C and half is D, distributed uniformly at random.
For a Monte Carlo step (MCS), each player collects the pay-
off from all of its direct neighbors. In each pairwise interac-
tion, we randomly choose the matrix G1 with probability w,
or the matrix G2 with probability 1 − w, to be the game that
is played between the two players during this particular inter-
action. After the payoff of every site is obtained, we assume a
copy mechanism that allows sites to change their strategy. The
selected site, i, randomly chooses one of its neighbors j, and
copies the strategy of j with probability p(∆uij). The prob-
ability of imitation is given by the Fermi-Dirac distribution
[7]:
p(∆uij) =
1
1 + e−(uj−ui)/K
, (1)
where ui is the payoff of player i and K can be interpreted
as the irrationality of the players, which was taken as 0.3. We
did extensive simulations varying the value ofK , and we have
found that all our main results remain qualitatively the same.
We studied two update rules. In the synchronous update,
one MCS consists of the copy phase applied to every player
at the same time. In the asynchronous update, one MCS is
the repetition, N times (N is the population size), of the pro-
cess of randomly choosing a player to copy one of its neigh-
bors. We stress that biological and human processes are usu-
ally best described by the asynchronous update [77]. Never-
theless, here we present the results of the synchronous model
as a comparison to some properties of the mixed games.
We run the Monte Carlo dynamics until the network
achieves a stable state, where the variables fluctuate around
a mean value. We average each quantity over many MCS af-
ter the stable state is reached, and then repeat the process for
many independent samples [78].
The population is structured in complex networks and
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FIG. 2: Fraction of cooperation as a function of T for small game
heterogeneity. The graph shows simulation results of the mixed game
model (symbols) and the single game defined by the average game
(lines) for normalized asynchronous (NA), normalized synchronous
(NS), absolute asynchronous (AA) and absolute synchronous (AS).
Note that the mixed game has the same behavior as the average game
in each model, as long as the game heterogeneity remains small (here
∆S < 0.1). The parameters for AA, AS and NA are S1 = 0.1,
S2 = −0.1 and Sa = 0, respectively. The NS model uses S1 = 0.5,
S2 = 0.3 and Sa = 0.4.
square lattices. The complex networks are generated with the
Krapivsky-Redner algorithm [79], a type of growing network
with redirection (GNR) method. We initially create a closed
loop with 6 vertices, each one having two directed connec-
tions. Then we add a new vertex by randomly connecting it to
any of the vertices from the network (growing) and then redi-
rect the connection to the ancestor of this vertex with prob-
ability r (Redirection). We repeat this process until the net-
work achieves its final size N . Using r = 0.5, we can create
a final distribution that has the properties of a scale-free net-
work [80, 81], with average connectivity degree of 2.7. The
Krapivsky-Redner algorithm is useful because it is relatively
fast in computational terms and we can easily change r to ob-
tain a random network (r = 0).
In complex networks each player can have a different num-
ber of neighbors, which gives rise to a “topological hetero-
geneity” [82–84]. To analyze how the mixed games are af-
fected by topological heterogeneity, we used two different
payoff models, namely the absolute and the normalized value
[85, 86]. In the absolute value, the total payoff of each player i
is just the sum of the payoffs obtained in the interactions with
the direct neighbors, denoted as {Ωi}:
ui =
∑
j∈{Ωi}
G(si, sj), (2)
where si ∈ {C,D} is the strategy of player i and G(si, sj) is
the payoff of player i when strategies si and sj are adopted.
In the normalized payoff, the total payoff of player i is divided
by the number its neighbors:
ui =
∑
j∈{Ωi}G(si, sj)
ki
, (3)
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FIG. 3: Fraction of cooperation as a function of T for small game het-
erogeneity in the normalized asynchronous model. The mixed game
is composed of two prisoner’s dilemma games. The lines represent
single games with parameters G1 = (T, S1) = (T,−0.1) (doted,
black line), G2 = (T, S2) = (T,−0.5) (dashed, red line), and the
average single game Ga = (T,−0.3) (continuous, green line). The
mixed game, Gm, composed of S1 and S2 is represented by the blue
circle. Note that the mixed game Gm behaves as the average game
Ga.
where ki is number of direct neighbors of player i. The nor-
malized payoff model works on the assumption that maintain-
ing many connections is costly, so the payoff is reduced as
you get more neighbors [87]. It is important to notice that, in
the absolute payoff model, sites with many connections can
achieve total payoffs much greater than the average network
payoff. By using this four models (synchronous and asyn-
chronous update rules with either absolute or normalized pay-
offs), applied to different interaction networks (square lattice,
random, and scale-free) we are able to confirm the robustness
of our results in a broad range of settings. While we do ob-
serve quantitative variations in different setups, qualitatively
we always obtain the same results, which are thus robust to
differences in the accumulation of payoffs, the updating pro-
tocol, and the interaction networks.
III. RESULTS
We analyzed the mixed game model in populations struc-
tured in scale-free networks (r = 0.5), random networks
(r = 0.0), and square-lattices. The population size is with
N = 104. We used both synchronous and asynchronous
Monte Carlo update rules with absolute and normalized pay-
offs. The MC dynamics was run until the system reaches an
equilibrium region where the fraction of cooperation fluctu-
ates around a mean value. The mean value was calculated
over 3 × 103 MCS in the equilibrium region. The transient
time needed to reach equilibrium varies: 7× 103 MCS for the
normalized asynchronous and the normalized synchronous;
6 × 104 MCS for the absolute asynchronous; and 4.5 × 104
MCS for the absolute synchronous. The equilibrium average
was then averaged over 100 different networks generated with
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FIG. 4: Cooperation increase in mixed games (ρ), compared to the
average game (ρa), as game heterogeneity increases in scale-free net-
works. The average game is the weak prisoner’s dilemma. Greater
heterogeneity benefits cooperation, although asynchronous models
seems to obtain a greater advantage. The weak prisoner’s dilemma
parameters are Sa = 0 and T = 1.7.
the same parameters. Note that the absolute payoff models
have a very long relaxation time, compared to the normalized
ones. This happens because hubs can obtain huge total pay-
off’s, even when the system is far away from the equilibrium,
generating meta-stable states.
A. Small game heterogeneity
We found that for all synchronization and payoff rules stud-
ied here the final fraction of cooperators in the mixed game is
the same as in the average game as long as the mixed game
does not differ much from the average single game, more
specifically, as long as the ∆S < 0.2. Figure 2 shows all
four models used in scale-free networks. The average game
is represented by the lines and the mixed game by symbols.
Here we used a mixture of Prisoners Dilemma and snowdrift
(S1 = 0.1 and S2 = −0.1) for the normalized asynchronous,
absolute asynchronous and absolute synchronous models. The
normalized synchronous used a combination of two snowdrift
games (S1 = 0.5 and S2 = 0.3). As can be seem in the figure,
the mixed game behaves as the average game for small ∆ in
the four models. Figure 3 shows the asynchronous model in
detail, the lines represent the single games G1, G2 and their
average Ga, while the symbols are for the mixed game (Gm)
composed by G1 and G2.
It is important to notice that each model exhibits different
behaviors: different cooperation levels and different critical
values of T for the extinction of cooperation (an extensive re-
view can be found in [7]). We do not wish to analyze these
differences, as they are well know in the literature. Instead,
our goal is to analyze the effect of game heterogeneity in all
models.
The average payoff is the same in the average single game
and in the mixed game. As in [71, 75], the addition of coop-
erative games together with more selfish games do not change
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FIG. 5: Cooperation increase in mixed games (ρ), compared to the
average game (ρa), as game heterogeneity increases in random net-
works. The behavior of each model is different from the complex
networks, Nevertheless the cooperation still benefits from the het-
erogeneity. We used the weak prisoner’s dilemma for the average
game and T = 1.8.
the mean payoff. In contrast, punishment mechanisms often
increases cooperation while lowering the average payoff [88].
The equivalence between the mixed game and the average-
single game also holds for different values of w. We also
studied random networks (r = 0) and super-hubs networks
(r = 1.0; every vertex is connected to one of the six ini-
tial nodes) [79]. For our models the main result shown in
Fig. 3 still holds: the mixed game is equivalent to the aver-
age single game in the terms of the final number of coopera-
tors and the average payoff, as long as the game heterogeneity
∆S is small. This result reinforces what was already know
for mixed games in well-mixed populations, rings and square
lattices [69, 76]. We point out that the dynamic of coopera-
tion is highly dependent on the topology [7, 9, 80, 83, 86, 89–
92], nevertheless the mixed game still behaves as the average
game. It is very interesting to notice that the topology, irra-
tionality, update rule and copy mechanism drastically alters
the final fraction of cooperators, but it seems not to change
the equivalence between the average and the mixed game if
heterogeneity is small. We found that the only thing that con-
siderably changes this behavior, is how distant the parameters
(S or T ) are from their mean value. In the next section we
proceed to study the effect of large game heterogeneity.
B. Large game heterogeneity
Game heterogeneity in the mixed game model can be mea-
sured by ∆S. If the mixed game was equivalent to the average
single game for any condition, the variation of ∆S would be
irrelevant. We found impressive results showing that game
heterogeneity enhances cooperation, as shown in Fig. 4 for
scale-free networks (in this case, the average game is a weak
prisoner’s dilemma given by Sa = 0 and Ta = 1.7). Note
that although the average game remains the same, the games
G1 andG2 become more distinct as ∆S increases. Obviously,
5FIG. 6: Color map showing how game heterogeneity (∆S) affects
cooperation for various T values in the absolute asynchronous (a)
and normalized asynchronous (b) scale-free network model. Each
model has an optimum T value, where the evolution of cooperation
is enhanced the most.
for ∆S = 0 we get the trivial case G1 = G2 = Ga. It is in-
teresting to notice that an increase in ∆S favours cooperation
despite the fact that, at the same time G1 becomes more “co-
operative”, G2 becomes more “selfish”. Figure 5 shows the
effect of large game heterogeneity in random networks for a
mixture of games in which the average game is a weak pris-
oner’s dilemma with T = 1.8. The effect of heterogeneity
is stronger in random networks than in scale-free networks.
Results from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 shows that although the final
fraction of cooperation can be increased by game heterogene-
ity, it is highly sensitive to the model.
The enhancement of cooperation due to game heterogeneity
on S happens for all values of T , as shown in Fig. 6 for scale-
free networks. The increase in ∆S benefits cooperation, but
there are optimal values of T where cooperation is most pro-
moted. For the normalized asynchronous model, a boost of
0.15 is obtained at T = 1.45. Figure 7 shows the fraction
of cooperation as a function of T in random networks. The
cooperation boost is of almost 0.3 in some points.
The analysis of the mixed game model in square lattices
was very surprising. For T values where cooperation usu-
ally survives in the average single game, we found that large
game heterogeneity in S promotes cooperation in the mixed
game. More interestingly, we found that for the synchronous
update cooperation can spontaneously re-emerge even after
the critical value of cooperation extinction (Tc ≈ 1.04 for
the synchronous model in single games [7]), as shown in Fig.
8. Game heterogeneity make the cooperation re-emerge for
some values in the range 0.2 < ∆S < 0.6. In scale-free and
random networks, heterogeneity merely enhanced the fraction
of cooperation. But in square lattices, the mixed game is to-
tally dominated by defectors until the heterogeneity reaches
0.2, when the cooperators re-emerge.
FIG. 7: Color map showing how ∆S affects cooperation in the
absolute asynchronous (a) and normalized asynchronous (b) model
for different values of T in the random network. It can be seem
here,comparing to the scale-free color map, how the optimum T
value for increasing cooperation is highly dependent on the topol-
ogy and synchronization of the model. On this points cooperation
can be enhanced in even 0.3 compared to the average game.
To understand how game heterogeneity promotes cooper-
ation, we investigate asymmetries introduced by the mixture
of PD and SD games on the square lattice. We analyze the
histogram describing the number of times each cooperator
plays G1 (SD game), or G2 (PD game), during a typical
Monte Carlo step. The average game is the weak prisoner’s
dilemma, G1 favors cooperation (S > 0), while G2 favors
defection (S < 0). This creates a natural separation in the
population
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FIG. 8: Total fraction of cooperation as ∆S increases on the square
lattice using T = 1.04. The asynchronous model exhibit enhance-
ments due to game heterogeneity, but for T = 1.04 the synchronous
model should have the cooperation extinct in the average game. Nev-
ertheless, for some ∆S values the cooperation re-appears even after
the extinction threshold.
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FIG. 9: Difference in the populations of cooperators playing the
snowdrift (ρ+ ) and the prisoner’s dilemma (ρ−) game as T increases
for various values of ∆S. Notice the asymmetry, where cooperators
play the SD game more frequently. The difference is always positive
and grows with increasing values of ∆S.
population between SD (ρ+) and PD (ρ−) players. However,
the separation is not fixed but changes during the evolution.
By recording who plays PD and who plays the SD game, and
when, we find that most players usually play both games with
equal probability over time. Nevertheless, there are some dif-
ferences across the population. Results presented in Fig. 9
reveal that the fraction of cooperators who play SD more of-
ten is higher than the fraction of cooperators who play PD
more often. This asymmetry indicates that even if the games
are randomly chosen at each step, there is a flux of coopera-
tion towards sites where cooperation is favored. In contrast,
defectors do not benefit from the PD population.
The histogram analysis indicates that cooperation enhance-
ment is due to the intrinsic asymmetry between cooperators
and defectors. Players that often play the SD game have a
higher chance of becoming cooperators, even in the presence
of defectors, because of the high positive value of S. Con-
versely, for greater negative values of S, players that often play
the PD game have no incentive to become defectors when they
are surrounded by defectors (recall that the P value remains
the same). In the long run, players will play PD and SD with
the same frequency on average. But, locally, some players
can play SD more frequently, increasing their chance to start
a cooperation island. The asymmetric effect of the negative
S on PD will not cause the opposite, i.e., high negative val-
ues of S does not lead to the formation of defectors clusters
[61, 71, 75]. In time, these small islands of cooperation can
grow and eventually become stable, enhancing the coopera-
tion of the model. This is the same asymmetric effect that is
observed in heterogeneous multigames [61, 71, 75].
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied mixed games on random and scale-free
networks, and on the square lattice, focusing specifically on
the effect of game heterogeneity. We showed that for small
heterogeneity, mixtures of randomly choose games games be-
have as the average single games, which agrees with previous
work using mean-field analysis for the square lattice and ring
topologies [69, 76]. We showed that the equivalence between
the mixed game and the average single game is still valid for
all various topologies, different synchronization rules and dif-
ferent values of irrationality. Nevertheless, our main result
is in large game heterogeneity regime, where heterogeneity
breaks the equivalence between the mixed game and the av-
erage single game and enhances cooperation. In particular,
the enhancement is highly sensitive to the topology and the
applied updating rule used to simulate the evolutionary dy-
namics. On the square lattice, for example, sufficiently strong
heterogeneity resurrects cooperation after the single game ex-
tinction threshold value of T .
Interestingly, the mean-field model predicts that the mixed
game should always behave as the average game [76], in con-
trast to what was found for the networks and the square lat-
tice here. This further highlights the importance of population
structure and how cooperation can thrive by simple mecha-
nisms such as network reciprocity and heterogeneity. Future
work could study mixed games using a normal distribution of
games, instead of just two games. Based on the results pre-
sented in this paper, it seems reasonable to expect that the
variance of the distribution would affect the final frequency of
cooperators.
Finally, we note that our results strongly supports preceding
works on how different types of heterogeneity, regardless of
origin, promote cooperation [23, 57–66, 93–95]. While game
heterogeneity does offer advantages to both cooperators and
defectors, only the former can reap long-term benefits. De-
fectors are unable to do so because of a negative feedback
loop that emerges as their neighbors become weak due to the
exploitation. As we have shown, this holds true also for mixed
games, and we hope that this paper will motivate further re-
search along this line.
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